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Abstract
When opinions, behaviors or ideas diffuse within a population, some are in-
variably more sticky than others. The stickier the opinion, behavior or idea,
the greater is an individual’s inertia to replace it with an alternative. Here we
study the effect of stickiness of opinions in a two-opinion model, where individ-
uals change their opinion only after a certain number of consecutive encounters
with the alternative opinion. Assuming that one opinion has a fixed stickiness,
we investigate how the critical size of the competing opinion required to tip over
the entire population varies as a function of the competing opinion’s stickiness.
We analyze this scenario for the case of a complete-graph topology through sim-
ulations, and through a semi-analytical approach which yields an upper bound
for the critical minority size. We present analogous simulation results for the
case of the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random network. Finally, we investigate the coarsening
properties of sticky opinion spreading on two-dimensional lattices, and show
that the presence of stickiness gives rise to an effective surface tension that
causes the coarsening behavior to become curvature-driven.
Keywords: opinion dynamics, social networks, influencing, tipping points,
opinion inertia
1. Introduction
Social networks represent potent structures on which opinions and behavior
diffuse, and on which tipping points [1] in the adoption of opinions and behav-
ior arise. A number of theoretical studies investigating the diffusion of ideas,
opinions, or behavior, have focussed on understanding how a small fraction of
initiators [2, 3, 4] or committed proselytizers [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] of an idea can tip
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over the entire network to adopt the same. Furthermore, within these studies,
various sources of competition to the spread of an idea have been considered
- for example, a competing idea that is spreading over the network, or a bias
external to the network that is trying to suppress the spread of an idea. More
pertinently, however, the tendency of individuals themselves to be pliable to
change is dynamic and could be dependent on their activity. In particular, in-
dividual behavior itself is subject to some inertia that opposes any change in
the beliefs or opinions adopted by the individual [11]. A well known example of
such inertia is the phenomenon of confirmation bias in social psychology, where
individuals tend to favor beliefs that conform to their currently held position.
Overcoming such individual inertia to change is therefore a primary considera-
tion in campaigns for public opinion change [12].
Motivated by this phenomenon, we study a theoretical model of opinion
change where individual opinion change depends on the current state of the
individual as well as the recent history of the opinions she has encountered in
interactions with her neighborhood. Specifically, we assume that there are two
opinions vying for adoption on a social network, and each individual requires a
pre-defined threshold number of interactions with the alternative opinion, be-
fore switching to it. Thus each opinion is sticky to its respective extent [12].
Furthermore, in an attempt to capture the effect of confirmation bias, we posit
that an individual’s memory of a stream of encounters with the alternative opin-
ion is erased by a single interaction in which he encounters his currently held
opinion. There is some precedent to studying such a memory-based model of
switching between states. Dodds and Watts [13] studied a model of disease
contagion where a susceptible person became infected only when his interac-
tions with infected neighbors within a certain prior time window had led to a
pre-defined infection-dosage threshold being exceeded. More pertinently to the
current study, Dall’Asta and Castellano [14] studied a variant of the Naming
Game with two pure opinions, where an individual switches to the intermediate
state only when the number of times he has encountered the opposing opinion
exceeds some pre-defined threshold. Our model thus is a special case of [14]
where the memory window is exactly equal to the threshold, and where no in-
termediate state is present. In contrast to the work done in [14], here our focus is
to look at the fraction of initiators required to bring about a tipping point. The
effect of stickiness has also been studied in the context of the Naming Game in
[15] and more recently in [16]. In these studies, the stickiness parameter quanti-
fies the probabilities with which a node in a mixed-opinion state rejects a pure
state that it encounters in an interaction with its neighbors. The introduction
of the stickiness parameter for nodes in the mixed-opinion state, gives rise to a
phase transition between a regime where the consensus states are stable (when
stickiness is low) to one where the consensus states are unstable and the system
gravitates to a stable state with a non-zero density of mixed-opinion nodes.
A recent work [17] has studied a variant of the SIR model where the infection
probability is a function of the number of infectious neighbors, and parametrized
by two parameters that they designate as stickiness and persistence. Despite
the nomenclature, the term stickiness is utilized in [17] to designate the slope
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of the infection probability of a susceptible node as a function of the size of its
infected neighborhood, and therefore bears little similarity to the context that
we study. Finally, recent empirical findings [18] demonstrate the dependence
of social network properties on cultural attributes of the population, suggesting
that stickiness could also be similarly influenced by cultural factors.
2. Description of model
Here we define the microscopic rules of our model. We assume that every
individual on a social network initially adopts one of two opinions, which we
designate A and B. The fundamental mechanism in our model for the change
in individual states is the interaction of pairs of individuals, which represent
speaker-listener pairs. In each such interaction, the speaker conveys his opinion
to the listener, and in response to this conveyed opinion, the listener changes his
state or continues to hold the same state depending on the rules of the model.
We elaborate on these rules in the next few lines. First, each opinion has a pre-
defined stickiness, designated as wA and wB respectively. The stickiness of an
opinion represents the inertia present in an individual adopting that opinion, to
change her state. In terms of the model, the stickiness wA (wB) of an individual
in state A (B) is the number of consecutive times she requires to hear the
opinion B (A), before she switches her opinion to B (A). Thus, we can assume
that each individual keeps a counter dedicated to counting the number of times
she encounters the alternative opinion, which resets to zero either when the
required number of consecutive interactions of the alternative opinion are heard,
or whenever the current opinion is heard. Note that in the former case, the
counter also switches the opinion that it is keeping track of. In our current
model implementation, we assumed that exposure to a different/same opinion
only impacts the individuals’ counter when their role is the listener in a pairwise
interaction. Naturally, one may consider the scenario where both the speaker’s
and listener’s counters are affected by the interactions (i.e., the speaker can also
be reinforced in her view). We did some explorations on this generalization
of the model, and have found that there are no qualitative differences in the
results.
In summary, the model dynamics proceeds as follows. The individuals
(nodes) in the network are initially assigned one of the two opinions such that
we have prescribed fractions pA and pB = 1 − pA of nodes in states A and
B respectively. Then at each microscopic time step, a random node is chosen
from the system and designated as the speaker. A random node is selected from
among the speaker’s neighbors and designated as the listener. If the listener’s
opinion is the same as the speaker’s, it’s progress towards switching is reset to
zero. If the listener’s opinion is different from the speaker’s, the listener’s count
towards switching increases by one. If the listener’s count becomes equal to it’s
opinion’s stickiness, it adopts the alternative opinion and begins a fresh count.
We assume that N such microscopic time steps constitute unit time, where N
is the network size. Thus, the event that a node is selected as a speaker is a
Poisson process with rate 1.
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Figure 1: The fraction of simulation runs on a complete graph with N=1000 that reach
consensus on opinion A vs. the initial population fraction of opinion A for different stickiness
values of the A opinion. For these simulations wB = 2.
3. Results and Discussion
3.1. Complete Graph
First, we investigate the outcome of these rules on a complete graph through
Monte-Carlo simulations. As shown in Fig. 1, we vary the fraction, pA, of nodes
adopting opinion A, and measure the fraction of simulation runs (over a total
of 500 runs) for which the system reaches consensus on opinion A. We keep
the stickiness of the opinion B fixed at wB = 2 and vary the stickiness wA
of opinion A. For a finite system, for every value of wA, the fraction of runs
reaching consensus on opinion A, fA, follows a typical S-shaped curve [Fig. 1].
For increasing system sizes, these curves are becoming progressively sharper
[Fig. 2(a)], approaching a discontinuous transition in the infinite system-size
limit and indicating the existence of a tipping point at a critical fraction pc.
For a finite system size N , we identify pc where the (forward) derivative of the
fraction of runs reaching A-consensus, χ ≡ dfA/dpA, is maximum [Fig. 2(b)].
These results also indicate that the finite-size effects of the location of the critical
point are negligible for this transition.
As demonstrated by the results shown in Fig. 1, for values of wA ≥ 3, at the
critical point, the opinion A initially constitutes the minority opinion. Thus,
having a stickiness even marginally greater than that of the majority opinion
allows the minority opinion to tip over the entire population, as long as the
minority fraction is greater than pc. For equal stickiness wA = wB = 2, the
fraction of opinion A holders must from the start be the majority opinion, in
order to win over the population.
As the stickiness of the minority opinion is increased, the takeover of the
entire network occurs at progressively smaller minority fractions. As shown in
Fig. 3, pc appears to converge to zero as wA →∞. For simulations shown here,
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Figure 2: (a) The fraction of runs reaching consensus on opinion A vs. the initial population
fraction of opinion A for different system sizes. These runs have wA = 4, wB = 2, and are
averaged over 1000 runs. (b) Forward derivative of the fraction of runs reaching consensus on
opinion A from (a) vs. the initial population fraction of opinion A.
N = 1000, and hence the smallest value that pc can adopt is 0.001. However,
we show using a semi-analytic approach (Sec. 3.2) that an upper bound to the
critical value pc itself converges to 0 as wA →∞ [Fig. 3(a) inset], which confirms
that the critical fraction vanishes for asymptotically large stickiness.
Note that the full dependence of the tipping point pc on the stickiness pa-
rameters wA and wB is rather complex and non-linear. Our simulation results
and scaling suggest that
pc ≃
const.
(w
1/2
A /wB)
∝ wBw
−1/2
A , (1)
in the 1≪ wB ≪ wA limit, as shown in the inset of Fig. 3(b).
3.2. Analytical approximation for critical fraction on complete graphs
For convenience, in this subsection we denote the stickiness of opinion A by
w and the stickiness of opinion B by v. We denote the fraction of nodes holding
opinionsA and B by nA and nB respectively. The fraction of nodes holding opin-
ion A is comprised of distinct subpopulations that hold opinion A and have ac-
crued a certain number of consecutive hits from opinion B. We denote the frac-
tional sizes of these subpopulations by sa,0, sa,1, · · · , sa,w−1 respectively. Anal-
ogously, the subpopulations for opinion B are denoted as sb,0, sb,1, · · · , sb,v−1
respectively. Thus
nA =
x=w−1∑
x=0
sa,x
nB =
x=v−1∑
x=0
sb,x. (2)
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Figure 3: (a) Comparison between the values of the critical fraction pc as a function of the
stickiness of opinion A for a complete-graph withN=1000 obtained from simulations (averaged
over 100 runs) and through the semi-analytic approach (Sec. 3.2). In both cases wB = 2. The
inset shows the extended numerical results [using Eqs. (6) and (8) up to values of wA = 1000.
(b) Critical populations obtained by simulations for different values of wB with N = 1000
and averaged over 100 runs. The inset shows the scaled data on a log-log scale. The dashed
line, for reference, corresponds to a power law with exponent −1/2.
We can write evolution equations for the density of nodes in states A and
B, by noting that a change in opinion occurs when a node whose counter for
the alternate opinion is just below the stickiness of its current opinion, encoun-
ters the alternate opinion. Thus, the density of nodes with opinion A evolves
according to the equation:
dnA
dt
= −nB sa,w−1 + nA sb,v−1, (3)
where the first term captures the loss of nodes in state A, resulting from nodes
represented by the fraction sa,w−1 hearing opinion B. The second term analo-
gously captures the gain resulting from nodes represented by the fraction sb,v−1
hearing opinion A. Similarly,
dnB
dt
= −nA sb,v−1 + nB sa,w−1, (4)
Next, in order to make these equations tractable, we introduce a quasi-steady
state approximation for obtaining the subpopulation fractions for each opinion.
Specifically, we assume:
sa,x = sa,0 (nB)
x
sb,x = sb,0 (nA)
x. (5)
Namely, we assume that the fraction of nodes in state {a, x} at a given
time is approximately equal to the probability, given the systems current state,
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of picking a node in state {a, 0}, and picking a node in state B on every one
of x trials with replacement. This assumption, commonly used in the study
of chemical reaction systems with intermediates, is known as the quasi-steady-
state assumption [19], referring to the fact that the intermediate subpopulations
arising in the transition from state {a, 0} to state {b, 0} and vice-versa, are
assumed to be in steady-state. This can be seen from the evolution equation
for a particular subpopulation, say {a, x}:
dsa,x
dt
= −nA sa,x − nB sa,x + nB sa,x−1
Since nA + nB = 1, the steady-state expression for fraction of nodes in state
{a, x} is: sa,x = nB sa,x−1. Thus, sa,x = (nB)
x sa,0. Using this approximation,
Eqs. (3), (4) become:
dnA
dt
= −(nB)
w sa,0 + (nA)
v sb,0
dnB
dt
= −(nA)
v sb,0 + (nB)
w sa,0 (6)
Additionally, we have evolution equations for nodes in states {a, 0} and {b, 0}
as well:
dsa,0
dt
= −nB sa,0 + nA
w−1∑
x=1
sa,x + nA sb,v−1
dsb,0
dt
= −nA sb,0 + nB
v−1∑
x=1
sb,x + nB sa,w−1 (7)
and using the quasi-steady-state assumption and Eqs. (2), we obtain:
dsa,0
dt
= −nB sa,0 + nA (nA − sa,0) + (nA)
v sb,0
dsb,0
dt
= −nA sb,0 + nB (nB − sb,0) + (nB)
w sa,0 (8)
We numerically solve the coupled equations, Eqs. (6) and (8) for different initial
fractions ninitA , n
init
B (with n
init
A < n
init
B ) and obtain the steady state values of nA
and nB respectively. We then record the smallest value of n
init
A at which the
steady state value of nA becomes greater than 0.99 and designate this as the crit-
ical initial minority fraction pc required to tip the system over. Figure 3 shows
a comparison for the tipping point pc obtained through this semi-analytical
approach and that obtained from simulation for different stickiness values of
opinion A (while the stickiness of the other opinion is held fixed at wB=2). The
cause of the higher pc values yielded by the semi-analytical approach is the over-
estimation of subspecies densities (sa,x, sb,x for x > 0) in the initial phase of the
dynamics - in reality the subspecies densities take some length of time to attain
non-zero values. This overestimation favors the sustenance of nodes in state B,
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Figure 4: The critical fraction pc vs. the stickiness of opinion A on Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs with
N=1000 for various average degree 〈k〉.
since they are initially in the majority. As a result, the fraction of nodes in
state A required to tip the system over, as estimated by the quasi-steady-state
approximation, is larger. Thus, the semi-analytical estimate of pc consistently
represents an upper-bound to the value observed in simulations. Furthermore,
in the event that the stickiness of opinion A diverges, Eq. (6) shows that for any
non-zero initial density of A opinions, nA grows monotonically while nB decays
monotonically, showing that the true critical fraction pc is bounded above by a
value that vanishes in the asymptotic limit of stickiness.
3.3. Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph
A similar asymptotic dependence of pc on wA with wB = 2 is observed
for Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graphs of size N = 1000, as shown in 4. Lowering the
average degree of the graph 〈k〉 tends to lower the critical value. For comparison,
we also show the critical values obtained for the corresponding complete graph
with 1000 nodes.
3.4. Curvature-driven coarsening in the presence of stickiness
Next, we investigate how the introduction of stickiness into the rules of
opinion change affects the coarsening behavior of the system. To facilitate
comparison with previous studies, we investigate the evolution of a circular
droplet of nodes in state A immersed in a sea of nodes holding opinion B in
two dimensions. First, we visually inspect this evolution under the rules of the
model, for various combinations of values for wA and wB . The nodes in this
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case, are the sites of a square lattice (with each node connected to 4 nearest
neighbors) of side L = 250 without periodic boundary conditions. The droplet
initially has a radius of R0 = 35. For wA = wB = 1, there is no stickiness
in either opinion, and the dynamics reduces to that of the voter model [20],
where one interaction with the alternative opinion is sufficient to cause a node
to change its opinion. Figure 5(a) shows the evolution of the droplet in this
case. As demonstrated in a previous study [21], the noise-driven roughening
of the interface is clearly visible as the droplet evolves. Next, we introduce
stickiness in the opinions by assuming wA = wB = 2. The initial conditions
are identical to those for the case shown in Fig. 5(a). Figure 5(b) shows a
markedly different picture and the presence of an effective surface tension in the
model is evident from the preservation of interface smoothness over time. This
curvature-driven evolution is consistent with behavior observed in prior studies
on voter-like models with intermediate states [22, 23, 24] or memory [14], since
the effect of stickiness (or memory) is similar to that of intermediate states that
intercede the transition between two opinions. Finally, stickiness in only one
of the two opinions is sufficient (see Figs. 5(c),(d)) to keep curvature-driven
behavior intact.
Next, we investigate the coarsening behavior quantitatively. We track the
evolution of the density of interfaces, ρ(t) i.e. the fraction of nearest-neighbor
pairs which differ in their opinion. This is a commonly used order parameter that
characterizes the coarsening behavior [25, 26]. For curvature-driven coarsening
systems, the radius of the droplet changes linearly with time [27]. In 2D, it
follows that the interface density also grows or decays linearly in time i.e. ρ(t) ∼
c1 ± c2 t, where c1 and c2 are constants. Whether the droplet grows or decays
depends on both the initial size of the droplet, as well as the values of stickiness
for the two opinions. As shown in Fig. 6(a), the decay in interface density is
indeed linear, as predicted by theory. Here, the initial radius of the droplet is
R = 35, the lattice size is L = 250, and the stickiness parameters are wA =
wB = 2. Figure 6(b) shows the fraction of simulation runs (over a total of
400 runs) for which the droplet grows and spreads over the entire lattice (with
L = 35) as a function of the initial droplet radius for various combinations of
stickiness. The results indicate the existence of a critical initial droplet radius
for every combination, such that the probability of droplet growth sharply rises
for initial radii above this critical value [27].
In diffusive systems like the voter model, it has been theoretically demon-
strated that in the asymptotic long-time limit, the interface density decays
logarithmically [28] in 2D, under random initial conditions (see details be-
low). Figure 7(a) shows two snapshots of the coarsening process for the case
wA = wB = 1, on a 100 × 100 2D square lattice at time t = 0 (random ini-
tial conditions) and at t = 25, respectively. The diffusive nature of interface
evolution, characteristic of the voter model, is clearly visible and is consistent
with the behavior observed in the evolution of the circular droplet shown in
Figure 5(a).
Figure 7(b) shows the slow decay of the interface density as a function
of time. One must be careful, however, as the exact asymptotic inverse log-
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Figure 5: Snapshots of the evolution of a droplet of opinion A nodes in a sea of B nodes under
different combinations of stickiness parameters. The nodes occupy the sites of a 250× 250 2D
square lattice without periodic boundaries. Opinion A is in the minority in every case and
represented in blue. Nodes with opinion B are colored red. (a) Without stickiness i.e. wA =
wB = 1, the model becomes identical to the voter model, and consistent with observations for
the latter, the interface roughens diffusively, without any perceivable surface tension. With
the introduction of stickiness in at least one of the two opinions, (b) wA = wB = 2, (c)
wA = 1, wB = 2, (d) wA = 2, wB = 1, the interface evolution becomes curvature driven, and
the droplet retains its roughly circular shape as it grows or decays.
arithmic dependence of the interface density on time has long been known
to be challenging to demonstrate numerically [28, 29]. Specifically, for the
voter model, the leading-order asymptotic behavior for the interface density
is ρ ≃ pi/[2 ln(t) + ln(256)] [28]. As indicated by the results of our simulations
[Fig. 7(c)], our model with wA = wB = 1 approaches (albeit slowly) precisely
this type of long-time asymptotic behavior, as expected.
4. Conclusions
We have modeled a scenario where two competing opinions, ideas or be-
haviors vie for adoption in a social network. Each opinion is endowed with
10
Figure 6: (a) The radius of a circular droplet of opinion A nodes in a sea of B of nodes as a
function of time for wA = wB = 2. The radius is expressed in terms of the interface density
ρ and the lattice size (linear dimension of the 2D square lattice) L = 250, and shows a linear
decrease with time. (b) The growth or decay of the circular droplet depends on its initial
radius. Shown here is the fraction of simulation runs where the initial droplet grows and takes
over all sites on the lattice. In these simulations, the stickiness for opinion A is held fixed at
wA = 5 and the square lattice has dimensions 35× 35.
an inherent stickiness that impedes an individual adopting that opinion from
switching to the alternative opinion.
We have demonstrated that the stickiness of the dominant opinion on a social
network determines how large the fraction of minority opinion holders needs to
be in order to tip over the population to the initially minority opinion. We
have further shown that increasing the stickiness of the minority opinion lowers
the critical fraction required for its mass adoption dramatically as shown in
Fig. 3. In practical contexts, the stickiness of an opinion or behavior is related
to the costs incurred, or incentives provided by its adoption, in comparison with
the alternative. On two-dimensional lattices, we have shown that the presence
of stickiness in just one of the two opinions causes the system’s behavior to
belong to the universality class of models where coarsening is curvature-driven.
In contrast, in the absence of stickiness, the system belongs to the universality
class of the voter model, where coarsening is noise-driven.
In future work, it would be worthwhile investigating the relationship between
the ratio of the stickiness values, and the critical value corresponding to the
tipping point. Furthermore, empirical data from venues like massively multi-
player online role playing games [30] could be used as a test bed for validating our
model and estimating the parameters which govern inertial in opinion change.
Lastly, controlled experiments with incentives on online labor markets [31] could
further narrow down the conditions under which stickiness becomes a discernible
feature of opinion dynamics.
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Figure 7: (a) Snapshots of the evolution of a system from random initial condition for
wA = wB = 1 (becoming equivalent to the voter model). The color code is the same as in
Fig. 5. The lattice is a 100 × 100 2D square lattice with open boundary conditions. (b) The
interface density ρ as a function of time t on a 2D lattice with wA = wB = 1 for various
system sizes. (c) The same simulation data as in (b) but plotted as the inverse interface
density vs logarithmic time in order to compare to the exact asymptotic limit of the voter
model, 1/ρ ≃ (2/pi) ln(t) + ln(256)/pi (dashed line) [28].
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